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Abstract
In this paper we ask whether there is a relationship between land property rights
and international migration. In order to identify the impact of property rights, we
consider a country-wide land certication program that took place in Mexico in the
1990s. Our identication strategy exploits the timing of the program and the het-
erogeneity in farmerseligibility for the program. Comparing eligible and ineligible
households, we nd that the program increased the likelihood of having one or more
members abroad by 12 percent. In terms of number of migrants, our coe¢ cient
estimates explain 31 percent of the 1994-1997 increase in migrants from ejido areas
and 16-18 percent of the increase from the entire Mexico. We contribute to the
current debate on the determinants of Mexican emigration (Hanson 2006, Hanson
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and McIntosh 2009, Hanson and McIntosh 2010). Consistent with our theoretical
model, the impact is strongest for households without a land will.
Key words: Property rights; land titling; land reform; land inheritance; international
migration.
JEL Classication codes: F22, D23, Q15.
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1 Introduction
From 1990 to 2005, the share of Mexicans in the United States increased from 5.2 percent
to 10.2 percent (Hanson (2010)). During the same period, remittances from the US to
Mexico rose from US$2.5 billion to US$21.7 billion, with an average of US$7.5 billion, or
59% of the net FDI (World Bank (2010)). Mexico is the main source of both legal and
illegal immigration to the US. In 2004, 56 percent of the 10.3 million Mexicans in the US
were there illegally (Passel (2005)). Hence, illegal immigration causes a huge pressure
on the US government to limit border crossing (Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)), drives
the political fortunes of US Governors (Hanson (2005)) and stands high on the agenda
of every US presidential candidate. Understanding what drives this migration ow is
critical for any assessment of future patterns and policy design (Hanson (2006)).
Although recent contributions attribute a large share of this rise in migration to
demographic factors (Hanson and McIntosh (2009), Hanson and McIntosh (2010)), much
remains to be understood. In the 1990s, the Mexican government implemented various
policies that may have a¤ected migration, yet we lack rigorous econometric evidence in
this respect (Hanson (2006)). We contribute to the literature by showing that changes
in land property rights in the 1990s did a¤ect migration to the US.
The research questions are, is there a relationship between land property rights and
Mexico-US migration? If there is, do better dened property rights slow down or speed
up migration ows?
In order to identify the impact of property rights on migration behavior, we make use
of the land certication program Procede, which was implemented throughout the 1990s
and targeted all ejido land in the country. Ejidos are areas of land allocated in usufruct
to groups of farmers, called ejidatarios, and cover about 60 percent of all agricultural
land in the country (Velez (1995)). Procede provided households with certicates for
their housing plot, their individuals plots, and their right to use the common land. By
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providing certainty over their rights, the certicates may have led households to relocate
their labor supply in favor of o¤-farm activities, like migration. In order to account for
potential omitted variable bias, we exploit program timing and households eligibility
for the program. Comparing eligible and ineligible households, we nd that the program
increased the likelihood of having one or more members abroad by 12 percent. In terms
of number of migrants, our coe¢ cient estimates explain 31 percent of the 1994-1997
increase in Mexican migrants from ejido areas and 16-18 percent of the increase from
the entire Mexico.
The paper also contributes to the literature on land property rights and titling pro-
grams, and to the literature on international migration. Concerning the latter, in his
recent survey, Hanson (2010) argues that, notwithstanding the recent rise in global mi-
gration, it is very challenging to reconcile the level of global migrants (about 3 percent
of the global population) with large and persistent wage di¤erentials across countries.
This is even more puzzling in the case of Mexico, where borders are porous and illegal
migration is widespread. Hanson (2006) calculates that at the existing wage rates (con-
rmed by Rosenzweig (2007)), it takes less than two months for a migrant with 5-8 years
of education to recoup the costs of crossing the border.
There are two sets of explanations. First, cross-country wage di¤erentials may be
lower than the average earning di¤erences if migrantsself-selection is positive. This may
not apply to Mexico as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) nd that selection there is interme-
diate.1 Second, there must be large unobserved costs of migrating other than the cost
of crossing the border. However, rather than identifying these costs, the literature has
focused on the cost-mitigating role of networks at the destination (see Munshi (2003) and
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) and references therein). The present paper contributes
to this literature by identifying a strong yet neglected determinant of migration: tenure
(in)security. Tenure insecurity may have induced household members to stay home in
1Evidence is not conclusive though; see Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), Mishra (2007), Ibarraran and
Lubotsky (2007), Fernandez-Huertas (2010), Caponi (2006) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010).
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order not to lose their land inheritance. Moreover, it may have reduced the incentive
to use migration as a self-funding strategy to send money back home (Woodru¤ and
Zenteno (2007), Yang (2008), Mendola (2008)).
We also contribute to the literature on land titling programs. In the last decade,
research has mainly aimed at estimating the impact on investments (see Pande and
Udry (2006), Deininger and Feder (2009), and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010b) for
excellent reviews), whereas "the relationship between land tenure and o¤-farm labor
market participation is under-researched, especially in rural areas of developing coun-
tries" (Deininger and Feder (2009):256). For urban areas, the evidence is mixed. Field
(2007) nds a positive impact on labor supply outside the home among urban squatters
in Peru, while Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010a) nd no impact among urban squatters
in Buenos Aires. Whether urban property rights have an impact on labor supply out-
side the home may depend on whether the labor supply was constrained prior to the
change in property rights (Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010b)). For rural areas, Do and
Iyer (2008) nd a positive impact on o¤-farm labor supply among rural households in
Vietnam, although it is ten times smaller than the impact identied by Field (2007).2
To our knowledge, there is no evidence on the impact of land certication on migration,
which is the natural extension of the study of non-farm labor participation. Since Mex-
ican household members can now leave (and even rent out) their land without fear of
being expropriated or fear of losing their inheritance, they may be able to migrate to
higher-income work, which may imply urban areas or, in our case, the US.
The major added value of the paper is the identication strategy. Property rights
are typically endogenous to household behavior (Besley and Ghatak (2010)). In order
to tackle the corresponding identication challenge, we take the following steps. First,
we consider a land certication program that provides a neat source of discontinuity
2Field (2007) nds an increase equal to 3.04 working hours outside the home per week per working
household member, while Do and Iyer (2008) nd an increase equal to 0.36, almost ten times smaller.
In the latter paper there is no descriptive statistic on labor supply before (and after) the program, so
we cannot speculate on the extent to which the labor supply was constrained.
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in (de facto) property rights between certied and non-certied communities. Second,
we use survey data on the same households prior to the program to control for all
unobserved time-invariant di¤erences between program and non-program areas that may
be correlated with migration behavior.
Third, we control for unobserved time-varying di¤erences between program and non-
program areas, which may still be correlated with migration behavior, by using an
additional control group (non-eligible households) and employing a DDD strategy.3 This
identication strategy is what distinguishes the present paper from Mullan et al. (2011)
and de la Rupelle et al. (2009), who look at rural-urban migration in China, and de
Braw and Mueller (2009), who look at internal migration in Ethiopia. In contrast to
them, we use a land certication program (and a DDD strategy) to identify the causal
impact of land property rights on migration, rather than self-reported tenure security or
land transferability.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the certication program and
land property rights in Mexico; Section 3 discusses the theory linking land property
rights to household migration behavior; Section 4 presents the data, the identication
strategy, and the regression specication; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Context: Procede in Mexican ejidos
Following the 1911 revolution, the Mexican government established that groups of farm-
ers could free of charge receive non-transferable land in usufruct.4 The ejido is the
agrarian institution that is endowed with such land and which is generated with this
application (Quesnel (2003)). The ejidatarios are the farmers who applied for such land.
3See Field (2007) for a similar approach.
4Article 27 of Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1917).
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They could decide whether to divide part or all of the land into individual plots.5 Each
of them received one individual plot and access to the common land. Individual plots
were used mainly for rainfed agriculture, while common land was used mainly for cattle
and livestock grazing (Procuraduaria Agraria (2010)).
Throughout the decades ejidos arrived to include an estimated 3.2 million ejidatarios
in about 30,000 ejidos and to constitute 56 percent of the national land usable for
agriculture (World Bank (1999)).6 Ejidos became characterized by levels of capital
endowment signicantly lower than in the private sector (World Bank (2001)) and by
extreme poverty (Velez (1995)).
The 1992 Agrarian Law grants ejidatarios full property rights to their urban plots,
the rights to sell (exclusively to members of the same ejido) and rent out their individual
plots,7 and the right to use the common land, but not to transfer it.8
The law conrms the use rights on all plot types and introduces the transfer rights
on urban and individual plots. In addition, it introduces the rights to use wage labor
and to leave the individual plots fallow for more than two years.9 The limits to the right
to sell imply the virtual impossibility to collateralizing land to obtain credit.10
At the end of 1993 the government launched a massive certication program, called
Procede. As part of the program, ejidatarios rights over land were documented with
certicates issued by the National Agrarian Registry (RAN).
5Details can be found in Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1971). See articles 130, 134 and 135.
6The remaining land used for agriculture is private property and is not considered in our empirical
application.
7See articles 68, 79 and 80 of Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992).
8Only the ejido Assembly, in case of majority of votes, has the right to transfer the common land.
Such right is limited to the common land as a whole and to companies external to the ejido (art.75) and
does not seem to have been used in practice.
9Details of ejidatariosrights can be found in Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1971). For rights on urban
plots, see article 93. For rights on individual plots, see articles 52, 55, 77 and 85. Possible exceptions
are listed in article 76. For rights on common land, see article 67.
10A plot can be used as collateral only with credit institutions that already have commercial relation-
ships with the ejido, and, in case of default, the credit institutions can seize the plot only for the amount
of time necessary to get the money (Art. 46). So, we do not expect certicates to have increased access
to credit. Acquisition of full property rights (dominio pleno) requires an additional deliberation of the
Assembly and an individual application of the ejidatario to the RAN (Art.81-82). In practice, very few
Assemblies seem to have done so. Only 6/248 ejidos in our sample have adopted dominio pleno.
7
Certicates for individual plots (certicado parcelarios) included the name of the
ejidatario, the size and position of the plot, and the list of bordering neighbors. The
certicates replaced the old certicates (certicado de derechos agrarios), which included
only the name, the ejido a¢ liation, and the way of acquisition of the plot (Del Rey Poveda
(2005):162,166). Certicates of access to common land reported the ejidatarios name
and the proportion of the common land he/she had the right to use.
Procede aimed to provide certicates to all ejidatarios, i.e., they were all eligible
for the program. Non-eligible landed households in the ejidos were households with no
formal rights to land, either because they had no blood ties with the farmers in the ejido
or because they had blood ties but the household head did not inherit the land. This
group came to possess land through occupation of empty plots or acquisition through
black markets, and arrived to constitute 37.2 percent of agrarian subjects (World Bank
(2001):13-14). They did have the right to buy one urban plot (but not to trade it
further), which made them eligible for the housing title, but no right to individual or
common land, making them non-eligible for the certicates.
Rather than simply imposing the program on the communities, government o¢ cials
visited and informed them. Adoption required the consent of a large majority of eji-
datarios.11 The issuance of certicates was relatively successful. Procede resulted in the
issuance of "certicates to more than 3 million households" (World Bank (2001)).
The certication constituted a de facto change in land property rights (as opposed to
a de jure change), because, rather than providing rights, it improved ejidatariosability
11Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992) describes the adoption procedure in detail. The beginning of the
certication program required the head of the village (Comisario Ejidal) to call for the "Information
and Consent Assembly". This assembly required the presence of the simple majority of ejidatarios (rst
call), or any number of them (successive calls), to be valid (art.26). It also required the approval of the
simple majority of them to allow o¢ cials to map the ejido (art.27). After the measurement took place,
the head of the village had to call for the "Delimitation, Assignment and Entitlement Assembly". This
assembly required the three fourth of ejidatarios (rst call), or its simple majority (successive calls), to
be valid (art.26). It also required the approval of two thirds of them (art.27) for the map to be sent to the
cadastre (RAN) to be registered. The program terminated when the ejidatarios received the certicates
from the cadastre.
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to take advantage of their formal property rights.12
3 Theoretical framework
How can we expect better land property rights to a¤ect migration? The seminal paper
by Besley (1995) and the recent survey by Besley and Ghatak (2010) provide a simple
framework which, applied to our context, suggests that better property rights unam-
biguously increase investments via less fear of expropriation (by the state and by other
households) and gains from trade.13 International migration is a highly remunerative
type of o¤-farm labor supply. A simple extension of this argument to include o¤-farm la-
bor supply predicts a decrease in o¤-farm labor supply if investments are labor-intensive
(e.g., manure, land clearing, and adoption of labor-intensive crops) and an increase if
investments are capital intensive (e.g., machinery, fertilizer, and cattle).14
In this paper we formalize an additional mechanism recently suggested by Galiani
and Schargrodsky (2010a): the fear of expropriation from within the family.15 Before the
1992 Agrarian Law, ejidatarios transmitted rights over land only through inheritance.
The heir had to be unique, but the ejidatario could choose him/her by stating an order
of preference. If he did not do so, the law gave priority to the wife/husband and then to
the children, where the order among the latter was left unspecied. If the inheritance
went to the children, the ejido assembly intervened to determine the heir.16 When doing
12Di¤erently from the certication program, the 1992 Agrarian Law applied immediately to all eji-
datarios, independently from the possession of the new certicates. Article 4 Transitorios states that
ejidatarios in non-program areas maintain their status and can take advantage of the provisions of the
1992 Agrarian Law.
13A third channel, collateralizability of land, does not seem to be at work in our context (section 2).
14This channel refers to migration as a self-funding strategy, which is supported by evidence of a
positive impact of migration (or remittances) on agricultural technology (Mendola (2008)), household
investments (Yang (2008)), and entrepeneurship (Woodru¤ and Zenteno (2007)). See also de Janvry et
al. (1997) for a description of the migration-subsistence strategy of Mexican farmers.
15"The lack of titles may also impede the division of wealth among family members, forcing claimants
to live together to enjoy and retain usufructuary rights" (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010:708).
16See articles 81 and 82 of Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1971).
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so, the assembly took into account the ability and willingness of the (potential) heir(s)
to take charge of the inheritance (Del Rey Poveda (2005):163,173).
This encouraged strategic behavior by the potential heirs (Del Rey Poveda (2005):182).
Signaling an ability to take charge of the land and a willingness to remain in the ejido
constituted an incentive against migration, since leaving was a clear signal of weak at-
tachment to the land (Del Rey Poveda (2005):170,184). This is consistent with anecdotal
evidence from Western Mexico:
The child who looks after the parents until their death develops certain
rights to the property. This may sometimes lead to awkward situations
among brothers and sisters who do not want one sibling to look after their
parents too much and in this way create claims to the land. (..) Alternatively,
a son who has migrated to the United States and declares that he does not
intend to come back, may be replaced as heir by a son in the village. (Nuijten
(2003):486).
The 1992 Agrarian Law maintains the same inheritance rule with one caveat: po-
tential heirs have three months to nd an agreement or the Agrarian Tribunal (rather
than the ejido assembly) will proceed to sell the land within the ejido and split the rev-
enue among the children in equal shares (Del Rey Poveda (2005):163; Riveros Fragoso
(2005):44).17
There is strong evidence that resorting to the Agrarian Tribunal to settle disputes
over land inheritance was a feasible option. The Agrarian Tribunal dealt with more
than 104,000 cases concerning land inheritance out of a total of 315,000 during the
period 1992-2005 (Morales Jurado and Colin Salgado (2006):229).18 Land inheritance is
by far the primary issue dealt with in terms of number of cases. Even more interestingly,
17See articles 17 and 18 of Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992).
18The importance of the denition of the heirs is conrmed by the HEREDA program (Procuraduaria
Agraria (2007):169). The HEREDA program started in 2001 and aims at letting all household heads
write down a will.
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data from the Procuraduria Agraria show that the number of land inheritance law cases
has increased dramatically in ejidos that implemented the program (Figure 1).
Thus, certication improves access to courts; potential heirs can now contest land
inheritance through outright negotiation in the shadow of the Agrarian Tribunal and
no longer have to be present in the ejido. A simple way to capture the inuence of
better property rights on o¤-farm labor supply via the land inheritance mechanism is to
consider a two-period extension of the basic agricultural model (Singh et al. (1986)),19
where the decision maker is the single household member rather than the household as
a whole.
Household member i allocates his/her labor supply ( T ) to in-farm (Tif ) and o¤-farm
(Tio) activities.20 Let Y (Tf ; L) denote the agricultural production given labor supply
Tf and land input L: The function Y : R2+ ! R denotes the agricultural technology.
Assume that
Assumption 1. Y is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in each
argument with lim
Tf!0
Y1(Tf ; L) = Y1(0; L) =1.
In the rst period all household members pool their in-farm labor supplies

Tf =
P
i
Tif

:
In return, each of them receives an equal share of the agricultural product: 1N Y (Tf ; L):
In the second period, only the member who captured the land can devote in-farm la-
bor supply to it (Tf = Tif ) : In return, he/she received the entire agricultural product:
Y (Tf ; L): Let w denote the return from each-unit of labor supply devoted to o¤-farm
19See Chiappori and Donni (2009) for a review of the literature on non-unitary household models. See
Browning et al. (2006) for a comparison between unitary and non-unitary household models. Within
the migration literature, see Rapoport and Doquier (2006) for a review of the literature on migration
and remittances using non-unitary household models.
20O¤-farm activities include local o¤-farm activities, domestic migration, and international migration.
As long as temporary and return migration are relatively common and the time horizon is medium rather
than short, international migration may be considered a continuous choice.
We abstract from the presence of leisure to keep the model mathematically tractable. We also ab-
stract from any distinction between in-farm (productive) labor and guard (unproductive) labor. This is
motivated by the fact that: i) guarding is this case is just a signal and does not require specic time or
e¤ort; ii) any distinction would be unobservable at the empirical level (in a rural context).
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activities21.
We assume that household members can inuence future land allocation by working
in the in-farm activity. The idea is that working the land strengthens the claims over
it22. On the other hand, an eventual dispute could be settled through a court, be it an
Agrarian Tribunal or a less formal local village council. The ability of courts to intervene
and settle the dispute increases with land property rights (). Weak property rights over
land leave room for expropriation from other households (E):
Dene the winning probability of member i as a function of own in-farm labor-supply
(Tif ), othersin-farm labor supplies (Tkf ; with k 6= i), external labor supply (TE) and
land property rights () in the following way:
pi =
8>><>>:
p
 
f(Tif1)
f(Tif1)+
P
k 6=i
f(Tkf1)+f(TE)
; 
!
if f(Tif1) +
P
k 6=i
f(Tkf1) + f(TE) > 0
p
 
1
N ; 

otherwise
;
where p1 > 0; p11 < 0; p2 > 0; p22 < 0; and p12 < 0: The rst argument corresponds
to a rather general contest success function, where f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0 (see Skaperdas
(1996) for an axiomatization and Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a review of the
literature). The key assumption is that labor supply and property rights are substitutes
in the land dispute. This assumption captures the idea household membersaccess to
courts is increasing with the available documentation.
21Clearly, when we consider migration w is the return net of all variable costs. Such costs are expected
monetary and non-monetary, where the non-monetary component can be substantial (Hanson (2010)).
In case of international migration there is also a substantial xed costs. This is trivial to add to the
model and it will be considered in the empirical analysis.
22Since we dont model heterogeneity across members of the same households, if they do not contest
the land their payo¤ is homogeneous across members. This could be interpreted either as equal prob-
ability of inherit the land or equal division of the land inheritance. The latter could take place either
directly by division of the land, or indirectly through assignment of the land to the heir and monetary
compensation to the others.
It would be possible to include some degree of heterogeneity across members through the contest
success function. This could account for specic inheritance rules like primogeniture. However, this
would not alter the qualitative prediction of the model.
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The timing is the following:
 all household members choose simultaneously their labor supply allocation (Tif1; Tio1);
 nature chooses the heir with probabilities pi;
 the heir allocates his/her labor supply (Tif2; Tio2).
The generic members decision problem in the rst period is:
max
Tif1;Tio1
1
N
Y (Tif1 +
X
k 6=i
Tkf1; L) + wTio1 + 

pi [Y (Tif2; L) + wTio2] +
 
1  piw T	
s:t:
8><>: Tif1 + Tio1 =
T
Tif1; Tio1  0
In case i becomes the heir, his/her decision problem in the second period will be:
max
Tif2;Tio2
fY (Tif2; L) + wTio2g s.t.
8><>: Tif2 + Tio2 =
T
Tif2; Tio2  0
It turns out (see the Appendix for a detailed analysis) that whoever captures the
land nds worthwhile to devote some labor to it. This makes competition for the land
asset salient in the rst period, which is when the strategic interaction takes place.
In equilibrium all members devote the same amount of in-farm labor-supply and this
amount is positive.
Concerning the relationship between (rst-period) labor-supply and land property
rights, the following result applies:
Proposition 1 Suppose that assumption 1 holds. Then household members in-farm
labor-supply is decreasing in land property rights, while household membersmigration
13
is increasing in land property rights23:
dT fi1
d
< 0 and
dT oi1
d
> 0:
Since the proposition applies to each household member, it applies implicitly to the
household as a whole:
dT f1
d < 0 and
dT o1
d > 0:
4 Data and estimation method
4.1 Data
We consider the 1994 and 1997 ejido surveys. The 1994 survey was carried out by
the Mexican Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Segreteria de Reforma Agraria, SRA) in
collaboration with University of California Berkeley and is designed to be nationally
representative of all ejidos (and communities) in Mexico.24 The 1997 survey was carried
out by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform with the World Bank following the same survey
design as in 1994. The surveys provide information on 1,286 panel households.25
The surveys provide detailed information on household membersdemographic char-
acteristics, past migration experiences, current migration experiences of children of the
household head living outside the house, use of land, equipment, and ejido characteris-
tics.26
23 If the membersequilibrium in-farm labor supply happens to be a corner solution (T if1 = T 8i),
then in-farm labor (migration) is weakly decreasing (increasing) in land property rights.
24The survey is representative at the state level. Ejidos were selected from each state except Chiapas,
where conict prevented eldwork. Details can be found in de Janvry et al. (1997).
25The attrition rate was only 4.0%. See World Bank (1999): Annex 2 for details. The program started
between 1993 and 1994, i.e., only a few months before the 1994 survey, which was conducted during the
summer. We exclude 14 households as they belong to ejidos with missing information regarding the
program, 108 households as they belong to ejidos that completed the program before the 1994 survey, 15
households because they are private landowners, 113 households due to unclear status (to be specied
later), and 110 households because they belong to communities instead of ejidos. The nal sample has
926 households in 221 ejidos.
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4.2 Migration to the United States
Mexicans started migrating to the US from rural areas following the construction of
railroads in the early 20th century and the Bracero program from 1942 to 1964 (Hanson
2006). De Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet (1997) show that the variation in migration
experience among ejidatarioscohorts is consistent with them having been part of this
migration ow. Out-migration is historically high in the northern and central regions.
These regions also constitute the primary location of ejidos; our nal sample of ejido
households is located primarily in the central (29.48%) and northern (22.57%) regions,
followed by the Gulf (17.28%), south Pacic (16.95) and north Pacic (13.71%) areas.
The distribution of ejido households across Mexican states is positively but not perfectly
correlated with the 1994 population distribution for the entire Mexico (the state-level
correlation is 0.44). In turn, state migration rates are positively correlated with the
distribution of ejido households (0.30) but not with the population distribution (-0.02).27
In order to identify migrant households we construct a binary indicator taking the
value one if any household member who is currently living at home has been in the
US within the previous three years or if any child of the household head currently
lives in the US. Migrant households amount to 15 percent in 1994 and 29 percent in
1997. The average number of migrants per household is 0.3 in 1994 and 0.72 in 1997.
These migration rates are consistent with Winters et al. (2001) for 1994 and with Davis
and Winters (2001) for 1997. The increase in the number of migrants from 1994 to
1997 (0.420) corresponds to about 1,384,281 additional migrants (both temporary and
permanent).28 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2003) provides some yearly
26These data have been used by several other authors for a variety of purposes: ejido reforms (World
Bank (1999), World Bank (2001), Munoz-Pina et al. (2003), migration (Winters et al. (2001); Davis
and Winters (2001)), o¤-farm activities (de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)) and cash transfer programs
(Sadoulet et al. (2001)).
27Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda (1995). Own tabulations. Migration is dened as the share of the
population that migrated to the United States within the previous ve years.
28The number of additional migrants is obtained by multiplying the number of ejidos (26,796, ac-
cording to World Bank 2001) with the average number of landed households per ejido (123) and the
increase in the number of migrants per landed household (0.420). Using the estimates in Winters and
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estimates of the number of illegal Mexicans who entered the US during the period 1990-
1999; the number of additional migrants for the period 1994-1997 is 1,873,000 illegal
entrants. These estimates rely on assumptions of under-counting and should be used
cautiously. According to Hanson (2006), the true ow could be 15 percent higher than
the estimate reported by INS, i.e., 2,153,950 entrants. During the same period, the
number of legal Mexican migrants was 511,883 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (1999)). Hence, the total number of migrants is between 2,384,883 and 2,665,883.
Based on these estimates, the 1994-1997 increase in the number of migrants fromMexican
ejidos corresponds to 52-58 percent of the number of Mexicans who entered the US. This
is consistent with migration stemming primarily from rural areas and ejido households
constituting a large fraction of the rural population.29
4.3 Identication strategy
In this paper we exploit both the timing of the certication program and heterogene-
ity in farmersstatus within ejidos to identify the impact of the program on household
migration behavior. The 1997 ejido survey contains detailed information on the imple-
mentation of the program. Ejidos that completed the program before the 1997 survey
are termed "program areas," whereas those that did not are termed "non-program ar-
eas." Households in non-program areas constitute our rst control group. Ejidatarios in
program areas benet from the program as they receive the certicate for their houses
and their individual plots as well as for access to common land.30
Davis (2001), one obtains 875,184 additional migrants, perhaps because they include "comunidades",
which typically have low migration rates.
29According to de Janvry (1995) ejidos include 70 percent of all Mexican farmers.
30 In the 1997 ejido survey, 13% of ejidatario households in program areas report no Procede certicate
for their individual plots. An additional 9% report to have receive Procede certicates for some but not
all their plots. The (unobserved) reasons could be the following. First, some of the certicates might
have not arrived yet. This is consistent with relatively low certication rates in ejidos certied in 1997
and in ejidos where the date of reception of the certicates is missing. Second, households may own
land in ejidos, di¤erent from the one they live in, which have not been certied yet. Partial and delayed
certication makes the estimation of the LATE of the certicates problematic.
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Program timing may be far from randomly allocated: government o¢ cials may have
implemented the program according to ease of entry; the decision to implement the pro-
gram by the ejido assembly may have su¤ered from collective action problems and from
the resolution of internal land conicts. Table 1 shows the self-reported explanations for
the decision to implement or not implement the program. As can be seen, the primary
reason to implement the program was tenure security (88.3%), followed by willingness
to solve border issues (29.7%); the primary reason not to implement the program was
lack of information (30.4%), tax avoidance (15.9%), and border issues (15.9%). Overall,
these explanations are certainly interesting, yet the only surprising feature is the small
role played by land market motives. We will make use of some of this information later
in the analysis.
In Table 2 we compare some observable ejido characteristics across program and
non-program areas prior to the program (Columns 1-3). Program areas have a higher
percentage of parceled land relative to common land, less ejidatarios, a more equal distri-
bution of parceled land, better infrastructure (access to paved road, electricity, drinking
water and drainage, existence of an assembly hall), and fewer boundary problems. The
di¤erences suggest that the program may have been directed to smaller and wealthier
ejidos rst, which is consistent with World Bank (1999) and World Bank (2001).
Non-random program timing may be problematic if the determinants of program
implementation are correlated with household migration behavior. In order to correct
for this bias, we could control for ejido characteristics that we found to be correlated
with program implementation (selection-on-observables). However, there would be no
way for us to be sure of having included all relevant determinants.31
In order to improve our identication strategy, we make use of non-eligible house-
31Two potential confounding factors are the pre-NAFTA subsidies and migration networks. Entry
into NAFTA led to the removal of subsidies to agriculture and, possibly, to out-migration (de Janvry and
Sadoulet (2001), Sadoulet et al. (2001)). This may bias our estimates if pre-NAFTA subsidies di¤ered
across program and non-program areas. The same is true for community migration networks (Winters
et al. (2001), Munshi (2003)).
17
holds as an additional control group and compare the di¤erence in migration behavior
between eligible and non-eligible households in program areas with the di¤erence be-
tween eligible and non-eligible households in non-program areas. LetMi be an indicator
for the migration behavior of household i and let P and E indicate program areas and
eligible status, respectively. Our baseline comparison is:
fE[MijP = 1; E = 1] E[MijP = 1; E = 0]g fE[MijP = 0; E = 1] E[MijP = 0; E = 0]g:
Let Mi(P;E) denote potential outcomes and assume that the program is randomly
allocated across eligible and non-eligible households:
E[Mi(0; 1)jP = 0; E = 1]  E[Mi(0; 0)jP = 0; E = 0] =
= E[Mi(0; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(0; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]:
Then we can re-write (see Appendix) the baseline comparison as:
E[Mi(1; 1) Mi(0; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(1; 0) Mi(0; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]:
This expression corresponds to the mean e¤ect of the program on eligible relative to
non-eligible households. Since one of the control groups (non-eligible households in pro-
gram areas) gets partial access to the program, the potential outcomes within the second
part of the expression do not cancel out and the estimator corresponds to a downward
biased estimator of the mean e¤ect of the program on eligible households (Heckman et
al. (1999)).32 Non-eligible households in program areas receive the certicates for their
housing plots; they do not receive the certicates for their individual plots unless the
32The econometric issue is very similar to control group members having access to a substitute program
(Heckman et al. (2000)) and to a measurement error in "eligibility" status among comparison group
members (Heckman et al. (1999), Heckman and Robb Jr (1985)). It is not clear whether both mean
e¤ects are Intent-To-Treat (ITT) e¤ects or not. For example, in Banerjee et al. (2010), part of control
group members access the program and the authors still present their estimator as an ITT.
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ejido assembly recognizes them in their status of possessors (which happens 66 percent of
the times); they do not receive the certicates of access to common land unless the ejido
assembly upgrades them to ejidatario status (which happens, on average, 34 percent of
the cases).33
In order to identify eligible and non-eligible households, we make use of pre-program
(1994) data on possession of an ejido certicate. Households with a pre-program ejido
certicate are termed "eligible," whereas those without are termed "non-eligible."34 An
informal check of the quasi-random assignment of the program across eligible and non-
eligible households is to compare observable characteristics of eligible and non-eligible
households across program and non-program areas prior to the program. The results
(Table 2) show a lack of signicant di¤erences across groups (Column 9) in migra-
tion rates, household demographics, dwelling characteristics, assets, and land transac-
tions. Besides, even the comparison of each group of households across program and
non-program areas (Columns 3-5, 6-8) shows very little di¤erences.35 Householdspre-
program tenure security is unobserved, but there are strong theoretical reasons to expect
tenure security to be correlated with the intensity of land transactions (Besley (1995),
Besley and Ghatak (2010), and Deininger and Feder (2009)). Table 2 shows that land
transactions were relatively widespread prior to the program, and that their intensity
does not di¤er across groups. This is consistent with case studies (Nuijten (2003)) sug-
gesting that informal tenure security was relatively strong and supported widespread
black markets.36
33This share is the outcome of the following back-of-the-envelope exercise: in 1994 there were 87
eligible households in program areas (Table 2); the ratio ineligible-eligible households in program areas
in our sample is 0.57, i.e., an average of 50 ineligible households in program areas; from 1994 to 1997
the number of eligible households in program areas increased from 87 to 104, which corresponds to an
upgrading of 34 percent of ineligible households.
34According to Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1971) (Art. 69) and to Del Rey Poveda (2005):166,
ejidatarios rights are acknowledged by certication (certicado de derechos agrarios). Indeed, these
certicates constitute the basis for the delivery of the new certicates (Art.4 Transitorios, Estados
Unidos Mexicanos (1992)).
35Table A1 (online appendix) conrms the comparability of the two groups across program and non-
program areas with 1997 data.
36 In fact, pre-1992 land transactions were illegal but widely accepted within ejidos (Yates (1981):181,
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The 1997 ejido survey also includes information on the date of completion of the
program. This will allow us to separate program areas into early (1994-1995) and late
(1996-1997) program areas. This di¤erentiation captures the fact that households in
early program areas had more time to adjust their migration behavior. It may therefore
also be appropriate to compare eligible and non-eligible households across early and late
program areas (Table A2 in the online appendix). Notwithstanding the limited sample
size, there are remarkably few di¤erences between eligible and non-eligible households
across early and late program areas (Column 8).
By using non-eligible households as an additional control group, we control for all dif-
ferences across program and non-program areas shared by the two groups. Still, it could
be that migration behavior di¤ers between eligible and non-eligible households across
program and non-program areas due to factors other than the certication program.
One way to relax this identication assumption is to control for household-level
characteristics, which we select based on the migration literature. Descriptive statis-
tics comparing migrant and non-migrant households (not reported) show that migrant
households are bigger, associated with a greater number of siblings of the household
head abroad,37 less likely to be indigenous, and associated with greater land assets and
better dwelling characteristics. On the other hand, their household heads are older and
less educated (but equally literate). Average schooling is similar.38
Another way to relax our identication assumption is to exploit the time-series di-
mension of our dataset. By doing so, the identication assumption is that the di¤er-
ence in migration behavior between ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios across program and
non-program areas does not vary over time due to factors other than the certication
and NACLA (1976):18, cited in Heath (1990):34).
37The number of siblings of the household head abroad is a proxy for the strength of the household
migration networks (Winters et al. (2001)).
38The absence of selection in terms of education is surprising with respect to the literature on Mexican
migration. However, note that the average level of education is very low in our sample (3-4 years of
schooling), while Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show that, in 1990, 73.9 percent Mexican residents had
more than four years of education.
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program. Thus, we allow for a di¤erence in migration behavior, but it must be constant
over time.
4.4 Regression specication
The model presented in Section 3 predicts that an increase in land property rights
causes a decrease in in-farm labor supply and an increase in o¤-farm labor supply. The
prediction is valid both at the individual and household level. In this section we will test
the prediction at the household level. Since the household surveys are rich in questions
on household membersmigration experiences but not on in-farm labor supply, we will
focus on the former. The outcome of interest is household migration status (see Sub-
section 4.2). As a robustness check, we will also report the results for the number and
for the share of migrant members.
We estimate 1997 household migration status with the following Linear Probability
Model (LPM):
yik = 1 + 1wi + 1(wi  eik) + 1eik +  011Zik +  012 (Zik  eik) +  013Xi + "1ik; (1)
where yik 2 f0; 1g is the migration status of household k in ejido i; wi 2 f0; 1g indi-
cates whether ejido i completed the program before the 1997 survey, eik 2 f0; 1g indicates
whether household k in ejido i is eligible, Xi is the vector of ejido-level controls, Zik is
the vector of household-level controls, and "1ik is the error term clustered at the ejido
level. We will also estimate the 1997 household migration status using a Logit model39.
Equation (1) then corresponds to the latent variable specication. The household-level
controls (Zik) are the following: household composition (age of the household head,
39The marginal e¤ect of the interaction term is computed according to Norton et al. (2004).
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number of adult members, fraction of females among adult members, average literacy40,
average schooling of adult members41), migration assets (number of siblings the house-
hold head abroad)42, and land assets (land used in 1994). The ejido-level controls (Xi)
are the following: land (ejido area in logarithm, share of common land with respect
to common and parceled land), population composition (dummy for indigenous ejidos,
membership to ejido union), and infrastructure (access to paved road).
The identication of the impact of Procede on eligible households (1) in (1) requires
that there is no di¤erence in migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible house-
holds across program and non-program areas driven by factors other than the program or
the set of controls we include. This specication lets us control for all unobserved di¤er-
ences across program and non-program areas common to both eligible and non-eligible
households (1) ; like distance from the border (which a¤ects the cost of migration),
historical community networks (which a¤ect both the cost of migration and its expected
return), and varying implementation of the program (due for example to administrative
capacity of the Procuraduria Agraria across areas).
To address the possibility that the identication assumption does not hold, we exploit
the time dimension of our dataset and estimate household migration status according to
the following Pooled Linear Probability Model:43
yikt = 21wi + 22 (wi  1997) + 21eik + 22 (eik  1997) + 231997 + (2)
+21 (wi  eik) + 22 (wi  1997  eik) +  021Zik +  022 (Zikt  eik)+"2ikt;
40This information is available for members currently living at home only.
41Adult household members are at least 15 years old.
42Notice that the siblings of the hosuehold head may have been part of the household before migrating.
Therefore, our measure of household migration assets in 1997 may be partly endogenous to the program.
In order to avoid this possibility, we consider its pre-program (1994) value.
43Again, we will also estimate household migration status using a Logit model (following Cornelissen
and Sonderhof (2009) to compute the marginal e¤ect associated with the triple interaction term).
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where yikt is the migration status of household k in ejido i at time t; wi is the dummy
for ejidos that received certicates in 1997, and eik is the dummy for eligible households.
The identication of the impact of Procede on eligible households (22) requires that
the di¤erence in migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible households across
program and non-program areas, due to factors other than the program and the included
controls, is constant over time. This assumption is weaker than the previous one, because
now we control also for time-invariant unobserved di¤erences between eligible and non-
eligible households across program and non-program areas (21).
5 Results
5.1 Impact of Procede on migration
Table 4 shows the results associated with the cross-section specication (1). Without
controlling for any background characteristics, the coe¢ cient estimate associated with
eligible households in program areas is positive and large (0.115), but not signicant
at conventional levels. We then control for background characteristics (Column 2):
the coe¢ cient is now larger (0.127) and marginally signicant. The marginal e¤ect
associated with a Logit model (Column 3) has similar magnitude (0.119) and is also
marginally signicant. The result is robust to the use of alternative dependent variables,
such as the number of migrants (Column 4) and the ratio of migrants to adult household
members (Column 5).
The direction, magnitude, and signicance of the coe¢ cients associated with the con-
trol variables are quite consistent with basic economic theory; i.e., the opportunity cost
of migration decreases with household size if agriculture is characterized by decreasing
marginal returns (each additional adult increases the likelihood of migrant status by 3
percent), and cultural barriers and geographical distance from the US are associated
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with less migration (the coe¢ cient associated with indigenous ejidos is negative in all
specications).
In order to nd out the seriousness of the concern for endogenous selection into
the program we restrict the sample to non-eligible households who did not receive any
certicate and estimate a di¤erence-in-di¤erence model comparing program and non-
program areas before and after the introduction of the program. Table 5, Panel A,
shows the results: the coe¢ cient associated with non-eligible households in program
areas is negative, small, and insignicant (between -0.035 and -0.062).
Table 5, Panel B, shows the results associated with the panel specication (2). The
coe¢ cient estimate associated with eligible households in program areas is positive,
large, and signicant or marginally signicant in all specications (Columns 1-8). Since
households in early program areas (1994-1995) had more time to adjust their migration
behavior than households in late program areas (1996-1997), we re-estimate some of the
specications using program timing, which takes the value 1 for late program areas and
the value 2 for early program areas (Columns 8-10). The coe¢ cient estimate is positive
and signicant, and its magnitude is consistent with the baseline estimates. Note that the
magnitude, which ranges from 0.112 to 0.129, is remarkably similar to the one associated
with the cross-section specication, which suggests the absence of any unobserved time-
invariant di¤erence in migration behavior between eligible and non-eligible households
across program and non-program areas.44 The coe¢ cient estimates associated with
non-eligible households in program areas (program*1997) and eligible households in non-
program areas (eligible*1997) are much smaller and generally insignicant, which is also
reassuring45.
44As a robustness check, we re-estimate specication (2) controlling for non-land household assets that
had shown some di¤erences across groups in Table 3. Since they may be a¤ected by the program, we
include pre-program assets in levels and interacted with the time dummy. Table A3 shows the results:
the coe¢ cient of interest is robust to these additional controls (0.112-0.118), although we lose some
precision in some of the specications.
45We also estimated a DD specication with sample restricted according to eligibility status. Table
A4 shows the results for eligible households (Panel A), ineligible households (Panel B) and without
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A coe¢ cient estimate of 0.12 is very large. It constitutes an increase in migration
rates of 80 percent relative to the 1994 average migration status (0.15) and 85.7 percent
relative to the 1994-1997 time trend (0.14). Since eligible households in program areas
are 32.2 percent of the entire sample, our coe¢ cient estimate explains 27.6 percent of
the overall 1994-1997 increase in migration. The land certication program appears to
have had a profound impact on ejidatariosmigration behavior. In terms of number
of migrants, our coe¢ cient estimates correspond to 429,238 additional migrants.46 As
discussed in Sub-section 4.2, the number of migrants from Mexican ejidos during the pe-
riod 1994-1997 equaled 1,384,281 people, while the number of Mexican migrants ranged
between 2,384,883 and 2,665,883 people. Hence, the coe¢ cient estimates explain 31 per-
cent of the increase in Mexico-US migration from the ejido sector and 16-18 percent of
the entire Mexico-US migration.
This magnitude can be explained in terms of great initial tenure insecurity. However,
it is also consistent with the coe¢ cient capturing part of the legal changes introduced
with Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992) (see Section 2). This would be the case if, for
example, eligible households in non-program areas were not aware of such legal changes
or presumed that they were conditional on the certication. In this case the impact of
the program would capture not just a de facto change in property rights, but also a de
jure one.
We know that implementation of the program required the substantial resolution
of border issues within eligible households and between eligible and non-eligible house-
holds. Thus, one may worry that our selection into the program may be a¤ected not just
by the eligible households, but also by non-eligible households. If so, our identication
strategy would fail to control for unobservable characteristics that could, in principle,
be correlated with household migration behavior. We therefore re-estimate specication
distinction in terms of eligibility (Panel C).
46This magnitude is the result of the following expression: 26,796 (ejidos, according to World Bank
2001) *111/211 (share of program areas) *87.01 (average number of eligible households) *0.350 (impact
on the number of migrants).
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(2) excluding all the households within ejidos that report to have implemented (or failed
to implement) the program to solve border issues or conicts between eligible and non-
eligible households. Table A5 shows the results: the coe¢ cient associated with eligible
households in program areas is positive, large, and marginally signicant in all speci-
cations. The magnitude is similar (slightly higher) as previously found: it ranges from
0.134 to 0.155. Thus, we nd no evidence that this particular selection mechanism drives
our results.
Finally, note that our theoretical model generates a prediction that may be applied
not just to international migration but also to domestic migration and o¤-farm labor
within the village. So far our analysis has focused only on the rst margin. There are
two reasons for this. First, the impact on international migration is arguably the most
interesting among the three. Second, the survey was designed with a particular focus on
international migration, whereas the emphasis on o¤-farm labor was not as strong. As
regards domestic migration, we know whether household members migrated to another
state. However, it is not possible to tell whether they migrated to an urban area within
the same state or remained in the same village. Regarding o¤-farm labor supply, it would
be desirable to know the number of in-farm and o¤-farm labor hours (like in Field (2007)
and Do and Iyer (2008)). To this end, we will have to rely on the information about the
primary and secondary occupation of household members living at home. Specically,
we estimate the impact of the program on non-agricultural status, i.e., at least one
member currently living at home works outside agriculture. Table A6 shows the results:
the coe¢ cient estimate of interest is negative and never signicant, and its magnitude
varies across specications. Thus, we nd no evidence of an impact on o¤-farm labor
for members currently living at home. This could be driven by measurement error in
the dependent variable or simply be due to international migration absorbing the entire
impact of the program on o¤-farm labor.
A subtle negative general equilibrium e¤ect of the program has to do with social
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cohesion within the community. Community cohesion implies non-monetary ties that
prevent people from migrating abroad (Hanson (2010)). The program may have damaged
such cohesion. This would not bias our parameter estimate of interest if both eligible and
non-eligible households were a¤ected in the same way, while it could bias the coe¢ cient
upwards if eligible households were a¤ected more than non-eligible ones. Fortunately,
our community and household questionnaire includes a question on the e¤ects of the
program on social cohesion (only for program areas), reading: "If the ejido implemented
the program, how has the program a¤ected social cohesion? (more, same, less)." The
fact that social cohesion was not a¤ected (67.77%) or even increased (22.51%) and that
these percentages are identical across eligible and non-eligible households is reassuring.
5.2 Do di¤erences in migration behavior reect anticipatory responses
to the program?
One may wonder whether the certication process may have led households to postpone
their migration decision rather than having increased the incentive to send one or more
household members abroad. For example, it could be that household members feared
being left out from the certication process and therefore waited for the certicate to
reach the household before deciding to migrate. It could also be that household members
abroad returned home just before the program started to ensure that they would not
lose future assets, and then went abroad again. If this were the case, we would be
confounding a short-term behavioral response to the program with a structural change in
the householdsmigration strategy. In terms of tenure security, we would mistakenly take
short-term tenure insecurity generated by the program itself for a permanent increase in
tenure security.
In order to rule out this possibility, we make use of future timing in specication (1)
using the 1994 household survey. If there is anticipatory behavior, then households in
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early program areas should migrate less than households in late program areas. Table 6,
Panel A, shows that the coe¢ cient estimates associated with this exercise are insigni-
cant and very close to zero, regardless of whether we consider program relative to non-
program areas (Columns 1-6) or soon-to-be-certied areas (certied August-December
1994) relative to all others (Columns 7-9), and whether we add controls, use a non-linear
model or alternative dependent variables.47
Second, the 1997 community questionnaire identies non-program areas that have
initiated but not completed the program (henceforth in-process areas). In contrast to
the 1994 soon-to-be-certied areas, we do not know when the 1997 in-process areas
will complete the program or whether they will do so before the areas that have not
yet started it. If this distinction between non-program areas runs along the lines of
some unobserved characteristic other than the timing of the program, then our previous
identication assumption does not guarantee the correct identication of the impact of
the program on in-process areas or the impact of the program on program areas. Keeping
this caveat in mind, we estimate the panel specication. Table 6, Panel B, shows the
results: the coe¢ cient estimate associated with eligible households in in-process areas
is negative, relatively small, and insignicant; the coe¢ cient estimate associated with
eligible households in program areas is generally consistent with the previous ndings,
although slightly smaller, and not always precisely estimated.
Overall, anticipation issues do not seem to explain the evidence gathered so far,
although we cannot exclude that they did play a minor role.
5.3 Impact heterogeneity and the inheritance channel
47The results are similar if we extend the time window for soon-to-be-certied areas to ten months
(August 1994 - May 1995).
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Impact heterogeneity may be used to identify the channel(s) through which the property
rights-migration relationship takes place.48 In Section 3, we suggested the land inheri-
tance mechanism, i.e., uncertain property rights keep landless family members home as
they fear to lose their land inheritance in case of departure.
In order to test this mechanism, we divide households depending on whether the
household head has written a will and re-estimate specication (2) for each sub-sample.
The program should have a strong impact on households with no will, as it reduces
the relativesneed to stay home to defend their informal property rights over the land
inheritance (since the certicate allowed them access to the Agrarian Tribunal to solve
any dispute). Yet, we expect the program to have little or no impact on households
with a will, as the identity of the heir is known and there is less room for dispute. Any
competing rationale (Section 3) would have di¢ culties explaining heterogeneity of the
impact of land property rights across households with and without a will. Table 7 shows
that, in support of the inheritance mechanism, the coe¢ cient of interest is positive, large,
and signicant among households without a will (Column 3: 0.147), while it is small and
insignicant among households with a will (Column 2: 0.039).49
It is important to recognize that such evidence is not conclusive. We do not know why
some households have a will and some do not. Del Rey Poveda (2005:185-186) argues
that household heads may avoid writing a will to reduce their childrens willingness to
migrate. This concern does not seem very problematic, as it may work as an attenuation
bias.
A more serious concern is whether the program led households to write a will. There
is anecdotal evidence suggesting that, while implementing the program, o¢ cials sug-
gested that households deposit a will (Del Rey Poveda (2005):179). If eligible household
heads with low propensity to migrate wrote down a will following the program to a
48 In the working paper version we also explore the impact heterogeneity with respect to land assets.
49 It is also consistent with a slightly di¤erent rationale (included in the model in Section 3), i.e.,
rather than attenuating the competition among potential heirs, land property rights attenuate the fear
of expropriation by other community members.
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larger extent than non-eligible household heads did, then the coe¢ cient estimate asso-
ciated with households with a will (Column 2) is downward biased, while the coe¢ cient
estimate associated with households without a will (Column 3) is upward biased. For-
tunately, this is not what our data suggest. The distribution of wills across households
(in 1997)50 is 25% and 34% respectively for non-eligible and eligible households in non-
program areas, and 45% and 37% respectively for non-eligible and eligible households in
program areas. Thus, it seems that the program led more non-eligible household heads
to write a will than eligible ones, rather than the other way around. If the decision to
write a will was somehow related to migration behavior, it would have to work like an
attenuation bias. Nonetheless, we know too little about the determinants of the decision
to write a will (and our data do not allow for much more than what we do here), and
hence we interpret the evidence in Table 7 as an interesting correlation rather than as
conclusive evidence.
In Table A7 we look at two other potential channels: land rental transactions (Panel
A) and wage non-family labor (Panel B). In both cases the outcome is a binary variable
indicating whether the household has been involved in a land transaction within the
previous three years, and whether the household has hired non-family labor within the
previous 24 months. In both cases, the coe¢ cient estimate of interest is always small
and never signicant.51 Another outcome it would be interesting to consider is land sales
transactions, but they are too few in our sample to even try to estimate a model. Thus,
we nd no evidence supporting channels other land inheritance.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we ask whether there is a relationship between land property rights and
international migration. We identify the impact of land property rights by making use
50The information about householdswill is only available for 1997.
51The results are the same if we consider the number of land rental transactions.
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of a country-wide certication program in Mexico ejido sector. Specically, we exploit
both the gradual introduction of the program and householdseligibility status.
Comparing eligible and ineligible households, we nd that the program increased the
likelihood of having one or more members abroad by 12 percent. The result is robust to
the use of alternative econometric models and dependent variables. In terms of number
of migrants, our coe¢ cient estimates explain 31 percent of the 1994-1997 increase in
Mexican migrants from ejido areas and 16-18 percent of the increase from the entire
Mexico.
We also nd some evidence that the impact of the program occurred through the
land inheritance channel, initially suggested by Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010a). The
land inheritance channel implies that household members refrain from migrating because
they worry about losing their land inheritance. Better land property rights attenuate this
problem, thus acting as a substitute for a well-dened land inheritance rule. Consistent
with our model, the impact on migration is strongest in households where the landowner
has not provided a will. It is di¢ cult to reconcile this correlation with alternative
rationales.
Evidence of a relationship between land property rights and international migration
is interesting also for other reasons. Notwithstanding its recent increase, the level of
global migration is rather low (3% of world population). This is at odds with a high
cross-country wage di¤erential and the cost of crossing borders illegally, which for at least
some countries is non-prohibitive. Our analysis suggests that weak land property rights
constitute a (typically unobserved) migration cost. This nding may help reconcile the
puzzle.
Although the results are specic to Mexico, whose proximity to the US makes it the
country with the largest stock of emigrants in the world, it would not be surprising to nd
similar e¤ects for other countries as well, although possibly limited to internal migration.
In 2009 the World Bank allocated about US$1.5 billion to 46 Land Administration
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Projects all over the world (Deininger and Bell (2010)). Many of them have emigrant
to population ratios greater than Mexico (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyz
Republic, Macedonia, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and Ukraine).52 It would be interesting to
investigate whether the studied relationship holds for these countries as well.
52See World Bank (2011). All countries mentioned have emigrant to population ratios above 10
percent. The Philippines, which is also implementing a Land Administration project, has a ratio just
below 10 percent.
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Appendix
7 Theoretical model
7.1 Equilibrium
The decision problem for household member i can be solved by backward induction.
First, consider member is second-period allocation choice (in case of capture of the
land inheritance). Drop the time-subscripts and write o¤-farm labor supply in terms of
in-farm labor supply: Tio = T   Tif : Once we do this, the choice variable is only the
amount of in-farm labor supply and we can further simplify the notation: Tif = Ti:
Member i faces the following problem:
max
Ti

Y (Ti; L) + w( T   Ti)
	
s.t.
8><>:
T   Ti  0
Ti  0
The corresponding rst-order conditions are:
8><>: Y1(T

i ; L)  w +   0 (= 0 if T i > 0)
  0; with ( T   T i ) = 0
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the rst constrain.
The end-point restriction in assumption 1 ensures that is in-farm labor supply is
strictly positive. However, we could either have an internal solution (T i = Y
 1
1 (w))
or a corner solution (T i = T ). Label is optimal choice as T

i = T^ ; where T^ =
min

Y  11 (w); T

:
If member i does not capture the land inheritance, then he has access only to migra-
tion and so T i = 0:
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Consider is rst-period decision problem. Again, drop the time subscript and write
o¤-farm labor supply in terms of in-farm labor supply. Member i faces the following
maximization problem:
max
Ti
1
N
Y (Ti +
X
k 6=i
Tk; L) + w( T   Ti) + 
n
pi
h
Y

T^ ; L

  wT^
i
+ w T
o
s:t: T   Ti  0; Ti  0
The corresponding rst-order conditions are:
8>><>>:
1
N Y1   w + 
h
Y

T^ ; L

  wT^
i
f 0(T i )
"P
k 6=i
f (Tk) + f(TE)
#
 2pi1 +   0 (= 0 if T i > 0)
  0; with ( T   T i ) = 0
(i)
where Y1  Y1(T i +
P
k 6=i
Tk; L);   f (T i ) +
P
k 6=i
f (Tk) + f(TE); p
i
1  p1

f(T i )
 ; 

;
and  is the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the rst and second constraint.
Since the structure of the decision problem is identical for all household members,
their optimal choices will also be identical. This, joint to the end-point restriction we
made in assumption 1, ensures that is optimal in-farm labor supply will be strictly
positive. Thus, we could either have an internal solution or a corner solution where i
devotes the labor supply exclusively to the in-farm activity.
Consider the case of an internal solution. Dene the argument of the maximization
problem in (i) asW i; so that the rst-order condition for household member i corresponds
to equation (i) without the Lagrangian multipliers, which we can recall as
T i :W
i
Ti(T

i ; Tk 6=i) = 0: (ii)
This is the necessary condition for T i to be optimum. The second-order condition
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is:
W iTiTi =
1
N
Y11 +
8><>: p
i
11 [f
0(T i )]
2
hP
k 6=i f (Tk) + f(TE)
i2
 2+
+pi1
h
f 00(Ti)  2 [f 0(Ti)]2 1
i hP
k 6=i f (Tk) + f(TE)
i
9>=>; a
where Y11  Y11(T i +
P
k 6=i
Tk; L);   f (T i ) +
P
k 6=i
f (Tk) ; p11  p11

f(T i )
 ; 

,
p1  p1

f(T i )
 ; 

and a  
h
Y (T^ )  wT^
i
() 2 :
Since Y11; p11 and f 00 are negative, while p1 and f 0 are positive, then W iTiTi < 0: So
the function W i is strictly concave and equation (ii) is a su¢ cient condition for T i to
be the maximum.
The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is the vector of optimal in-farm labor supplies
(T 1 ; ::; T N ) with generic element T

i such that equation (ii) is valid simultaneously for
all household members. As we noticed above, in equilibrium household membersequi-
librium choices will be identical: T 1 = T 2 = :: = T :
7.2 Comparative statics
Notice that the equilibrium condition for household member i isW iTi
 
T 1 ; ::; T N ;N;L;w; ; s; T ; 

=
0: Totally di¤erentiate W iTi and assume that dN = dL = dw = d = ds = d
T = 0; while
d 6= 0: Then the comparative static for household member i is:
dT i
d
=

W 1T1T1 ::  W 1T1 :: W 1T1TN
:: :: :: :: ::
WNT1TN ::  WNTN :: WNTNTN

W 1T1T1 :: W
1
T1 /T i
:: W 1T1TN
:: :: :: :: ::
WNT1TN :: W
N
TNTi
:: WNTNTN

(iii)
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where all elements are evaluated in correspondence of the equilibrium vector (T 1 ; ::; T N )
and the generic elements W iTiTi ; W
i
TiTj
and W iTi are:
W iTiTi =
1
N
Y11 +
8><>: p
i
11 [f
0(T i )]
2
hP
k 6=i f (T

k ) + f(TE)
i2
() 2+
+p1
h
f 00(T i )  2 [f 0(T i )]2 () 1
i hP
k 6=i f (T

k ) + f(TE)
i
9>=>; a
W iTiTj =
1
N
Y11 +
8><>:  p
i
11f
0(T i )
hP
k 6=i f (T

k ) + f(TE)
i
f 0

T j

f(T i ) (
) 2+
+p1
n
1  2
hP
k 6=i f (T

k ) + f(TE)
i
() 1
o
f 00(T j )f
0(T i )
9>=>; a
W iTi = p12f
0(T i )
24X
k 6=i
f (T k ) + f(TE)
35 a
Since in equilibrium T 1 = :: = T N = T
; the previous expressions can be simplied
signicantly: f (T i ) = f

T j

= f (T ) = f;
P
k 6=i f (T

k )+f(TE) = 
 f; f 0 (T )  fT ,
f 00 (T )  fTT 8i; j and f(TE) = fE :We also drop the star symbol from : The previous
expressions become:
W iTiTi =
1
N
Y11 +
n
p11 (fT )
2 (  f)2 2 + p1
h
fTT   2 (fT )2 1
i
(  f)
o
a
W iTiTj =
1
N
Y11 +
n
 p11 (fT )2 (  f) f 2 + p1

1  2 (  f) 1 (fT )2o a
W iTi = p12fT (  f) a
Consider the denominator in equation (iii). Subtract column (N) from columns (1)
to (N-1) and "move out" the common factor a from columns (1) to (N-1). Then add
rows (1) to (N-1) to row (N).
Consider the numerator. Extract the common factor from column (i). Then subtract
row (i) from all other rows and extract the common factor a from the latter.
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=  a
NfT (  f) p12
aN 1

 0 :: 0 :: 0
0  :: 0 :: 0
:: :: :: :: :: ::
W iTiT1 W
i
TiT2
:: 1 :: W iTiTN
:: :: :: :: :: ::
0 0 :: 0 ::  

 0 :: 0 W 1T1TN
0  :: 0 W 2T2TN
:: :: :: :: ::
0 0 ::  WN 1TN 1TN
0 0 :: 0 

=  afT (  f) p12

=   afT (  f) p12
Y11 + p1
h
fTT (  f)  (N   1) (fT )2   2 (fT )2 fE 1
i
a
where   p11 (fT )2 (  f) 1 + p1
h
fTT (  f)  (fT )2
i
,
  Y11+p1
h
fTT (  f)  (N   1) (fT )2   2 (fT )2 fE 1
i
a andW 1T1TN =W
2
T2TN
=
:: =WN 1TN 1TN :
Since p12; Y11 and fTT are negative, while fT and p1 are positive, then
dT i
d < 0
8i = 1; ::; N:
Since Tio = T   Ti; then dT

i
d < 0 implies
dT io
d > 0:
Consider the case of a corner solution: all household members devote their entire
household labor supply to the in-farm activity (T  = T ). An increase in land property
rights () may not be enough to change the equilibrium choice from corner to internal,
so the comparative static will be dT

i
d  0 and
dT io
d  0:
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8 Derivation of the estimator
Re-write the baseline comparison in terms of potential outcomes:
fE[Mi(1; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(1; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]g+
 fE[Mi(0; 1)jP = 0; E = 1]  E[Mi(0; 0)jP = 0; E = 0]g:
The assumption of random allocation of the program across eligible and non-eligible
households lets us manipulate this expression as follows:
fE[Mi(1; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(1; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]g+
 fE[Mi(0; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(0; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]g;
which clearly reduces to:
fE[Mi(1; 1) Mi(0; 1)jP = 1; E = 1]  E[Mi(1; 0) Mi(0; 0)jP = 1; E = 0]g:
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Figure 1 
Law cases concerning land inheritance before and after Procede 
 
Note: The figure shows the pattern in law suits concerning land inheritance (relative to other 
categories) before and after the program. See Morales Jurado and Colin Salgado (2006) for details. 
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Law suits 1992-2005
Inheritance Ejidal Rights Other
Sample
Program areas (N=111)
Non-program areas, in process 
(N=41)
mean mean
Tenure security 0.883 0.756
Solve border issues 0.297 0.293
Obey the law 0.153 0.146
Access credit 0.108 0.098
Rent and sell the land 0.108 0.024
Access to Procampo 0.018 0.098
Invest in the land 0.018 0.000
Other 0.000 0.024
Sample
Non program areas, program 
not even started (N=69)
mean
Lack of information 0.304
Avoid taxes 0.159
Border issues 0.159
Avoid conflicts between ejidatarios and 
non-ejidatarios
0.087
They did not summoned us 0.029
Lack of documents 0.043
Avoid land transactions 0.014
No interest in selling and buying land 0.000
Other 0.000
Note: Data from the 1997 community-level ejido survey. Ejidos that had terminated or started to 
implement Procede were asked the reasons for their decision to implement. Ejidos that had not 
started to implement the program were asked about the reason for this.
Table 1
PANEL A: REASONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM
PANEL B: REASONS NOT TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM
Program No Program Diff Program No Program Diff
mean mean mean mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log ejido area (ha) 6.85 7.14 * 7.00 7.16
% urban area wrt ejido area (ha) 3.53 3.41 2.80 2.28
% parcelled land wrt agr land (ha) 70.84 58.21 *** 73.02 59.80 ***
Number of ejidatarios ¹ 87.01 112.74 ** 104.46 108.65
Number of posesionarios¹ 9.67 24.87 **
Number of avecindados¹ 73.55 62.91 53.92 45.67
Ratio avecindados/ejidatario households 0.85 0.67 0.64 0.50
Average parcelled land per ejidatario (ha) 13.12 11.90 14.69 12.04
Inequality land² 6.03 9.85 * 9.33 10.10
Common land per ejidatario (ha) 9.84 8.64 9.43 10.56
Indigenous ejido 0.16 0.11 0.31 0.25
Membership to ejido union 0.32 0.41 0.25 0.28
Distance from closest urban centre (km) 23.93 27.59
Number of urban centres within a hour 1.72 1.39 *
At least one irrigation facility 0.42 0.31 *
At least one storing facility 0.15 0.19
Access to paved road 0.35 0.22 ** 0.70 0.58 *
% dwellings with electricity 79.79 71.31 * 82.32 80.05
% dwellings with drinking water 62.21 49.06 ** 68.13 54.57 **
% dwellings with drenage 15.19 13.22 14.06 9.41
Public phone 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.53
Street lightning 0.69 0.63 0.73 0.72
Auditorium/assembly hall 0.61 0.44 *** 0.64 0.38 ***
External boundary problems³ 0.24 0.59 *** 0.12 0.47 ***
Internal boundary problem³ 0.14 0.18
Boundary problem in communal land³ 0.14 0.40 *** 0.06 0.09
Squatting common land³ 0.12 0.30 ***
Kindergarden³ 0.80 0.85
Primary school³ 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96
Secondary school³ 0.44 0.49
At least one social program 0.57 0.46 0.54 0.54
At least one environmental problem 0.42 0.50
Observations 111 110 111 110
Table 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, COMMUNITY-LEVEL 
N/A
N/A
N/A
1994
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (3) reports the significance of the difference (1)-(2). 
Column (6) reports the significance level of the difference (4)-(5). Definition of "Program" in the text.
¹ Posesionarios  are households with ejido membership and formal right to land; avecindados  are households with ejido 
membership but no formal right to land, although part of them own land illegally; posesionarios  are households with no 
ejido membership and no formal right to land, although most of them owns land illegally.
² Land inequality measured as the ratio between the biggest and the smallest plot for entitled individuals. 
³ The definition of some variables differ across the two surveys: indigenous ejido (1997: "Are there people who consider 
themselves indigenous?"; 1994:"Does the majority belong to an ethnic group?"); external boundary problems (1997: "Are 
there boundary problems with other ejidos or other borderign private properties?"; 1994: "Are there law problems 
concerning the ejido borders?"); internal boundary problems (1997:"Are there boundary problems between ejidatarios 
about the division of parcelled land?"; 1994: none); boundary problems related to communal land (1997: "Are there border 
problems between ejidatarios about the assignment of communal land?"; 1994:"Are there problems concerning the 
borders of communal land?"); squatting of communal land (1997: "Is there communal land squatted by families without 
documentation?"; 1994: none); schools (1997:"Does the community have a kindergarden/ primary/secondary school?"; 
1994:"Does the community have a school?").
1997
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1994 1997
All All
Program No Program Diff Program No Program Diff Diff-diff
mean mean mean mean t-stat mean mean t-stat t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A: Migration variables
At least one household member currently living at home has 
been abroad (last 3 years)
0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 (0.446) 0.02 0.04 (-1.118) (1.196)
At least one household head's child is currently abroad 0.12 0.23 0.10 0.15 (-1.439) 0.09 0.12 (-0.527) (-0.442)
Migrant household (last 3 years) 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.17 (-0.784) 0.11 0.15 (-0.629) (0.045)
Number of migrants abroad (last 3 years) 0.30 0.72 0.27 0.38 (-1.048) 0.20 0.31 (-0.945) (0.013)
B: Household composition
Household head's age 49.85 52.88 51.06 50.83 (0.156) 48.04 47.59 (0.255) (-0.111)
Household head's sex 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 (-0.030) 0.95 0.99 (-1.695) * (1.397)
Household head's schooling 3.27 3.20 3.34 3.12 (0.784) 3.45 3.24 (0.564) (0.047)
Average schooling of adult members 4.68 4.66 4.79 4.67 (0.409) 4.48 4.71 (-0.663) (0.868)
Number of adult members 5.92 6.71 6.14 6.16 (-0.061) 5.31 5.67 (-0.831) (0.638)
Share females among adult members 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.44 (0.804) 0.44 0.41 (1.432) (-0.677)
Number of household head's siblings abroad 0.14 0.38 0.11 0.20 (-1.468) 0.09 0.12 (-0.576) (-0.891)
C: Household assets
1992 land assets (owned) 11.76 11.76 12.09 12.31 (-0.139) 10.61 11.29 (-0.325) (0.205)
Hired labor 0.37 0.45 0.42 0.37 (0.950) 0.36 0.28 (1.211) (-0.356)
Tractor 0.47 0.46 0.56 0.45 (1.750) * 0.49 0.31 (2.092) ** (-0.722)
Pickup 0.32 0.21 0.37 0.30 (1.340) 0.27 0.31 (-0.549) (1.332)
Machinery 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.55 (1.931) * 0.61 0.50 (1.419) (0.023)
Cattle 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.54 (-1.835) * 0.39 0.50 (-1.445) (0.074)
Horses 0.23 0.30 0.25 0.24 (0.380) 0.23 0.20 (0.614) (-0.266)
D: Land transactions
At least one land rental transaction (last 2 years) 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.10 (0.877) 0.12 0.07 (1.458) (-0.434)
At least one plot rented in (last 2 years) 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 (0.211) 0.08 0.05 (0.980) (-0.671)
At least one plot rented out (last 2 years) 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.04 (0.928) 0.04 0.02 (1.093) (0.052)
Observations 926 926 298 302 169 157
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) report sample means from the 1994 and 1997 surveys respectively. Column (5) 
reports the t-statistic of the difference (3)-(4). Column (8) reports the t-statistic of the difference (6)-(7). Column (9) reports the t-statistic of the difference [(3)-(4)]-[(6)-
(7)]. Standard errors associated with the diff-in-mean tests have been clustered at the ejdo-level. Definition of "Program," "Eligible," and household in the text. Land 
assets measured in National Rainfed Equivalent (NRE) hectares. For a description of the procedure, see de Janvry et al. (1997).
PRE-PROGRAM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Table 3
Non-EligibleEligible
1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Number migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*Eligible 0.115 0.127* 0.119 0.426** 0.075***
(0.077) (0.065) 0.067 (0.200) (0.025)
Program -0.081 -0.056 -0.074 -0.239 -0.039*
(0.066) (0.056) 0.060 (0.183) (0.022)
Eligible -0.031 0.104 0.187 -0.055 0.055
(0.058) (0.178) 0.192 (0.589) (0.076)
Household controls
Land assets 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.002) 0.002 (0.008) (0.001)
Household head's age 0.004* 0.006 0.007 0.002*
(0.003) 0.003 (0.007) (0.001)
Average literacy adult household members 0.016 0.014 -0.466 -0.036
(0.119) 0.101 (0.443) (0.050)
Average schooling adult household members 0.003 0.007 0.020 0.004
(0.010) 0.011 (0.027) (0.003)
Share of females among adult household members -0.197*** -0.226 -0.357* -0.047*
(0.060) 0.093 (0.184) (0.026)
Household size 0.027*** 0.026 0.108*** 0.003
(0.009) 0.009 (0.033) (0.004)
Number of household head's siblings abroad -0.033 -0.017 -0.108 -0.016
(0.049) 0.053 (0.143) (0.016)
Ejido controls
Log ejido area (ha) -0.015 -0.014 -0.075 -0.005
(0.023) 0.024 (0.088) (0.010)
% common land relative to agricultural land (ha) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) 0.001 (0.002) (0.000)
Number of ejidatarios -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) 0.000 (0.001) (0.000)
Indigenous ejido -0.159*** -0.188 -0.356*** -0.053***
(0.041) 0.048 (0.117) (0.014)
Membership to ejido union 0.022 0.013 0.117 0.006
(0.045) 0.045 (0.154) (0.016)
Access to paved road -0.097** -0.103 -0.211 -0.036**
(0.047) 0.045 (0.150) (0.017)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls*Eligible yes yes yes yes
Observations 926 898 898 898 898
Number of ejidos 221 213 213 213 213
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.157 0.169 0.174 0.094
Table 4
HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION, CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATES
Migrant household
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. 
Econometric methodology: Linear Probability Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-2, 4-5), Logit (Column 3). The marginal effect associated 
with the interaction term in Column 4 was computed following Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). Definitions of "Migrant household," 
"Program," "Eligible," and household in the text. Literacy is computed for members currently living at home only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Number migrants
Share 
migrants
Migrant 
household
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects 
OLS OLS LPM OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*1997 -0.035 -0.060 -0.062 -0.054 -0.039 -0.175 -0.032
(0.062) (0.060) (0.069) (0.062) 0.065 (0.191) (0.021)
Timing*1997 -0.026 -0.071 -0.015
(0.044) (0.136) (0.014)
Observations 452 451 451 451 451 451 451 432 432 432
Number of ejidos 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 93 93 93
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.126 0.495 0.156 0.152 0.159 0.141 0.158 0.165 0.148
Program*1997*Eligible 0.112* 0.124** 0.123* 0.121** 0.129 0.348** 0.070***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.065) (0.062) 0.056 (0.167) (0.021)
Program*1997 -0.047 -0.053 -0.053 -0.054 0.030 -0.180 -0.037**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) 0.035 (0.143) (0.018)
Timing*1997*Eligible 0.087** 0.242** 0.047***
(0.041) (0.103) (0.014)
Timing*1997 -0.042 -0.129 -0.025**
(0.034) (0.084) (0.011)
Eligible*1997 -0.056 -0.055 -0.051 -0.042 0.060 -0.183 -0.042** -0.042 -0.198* -0.043**
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) 0.070 (0.114) (0.018) (0.040) (0.108) (0.017)
1997 0.166*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.117 0.466*** 0.070*** 0.136*** 0.477*** 0.070***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) 0.017 (0.113) (0.017) (0.036) (0.106) (0.016)
Observations 1 852 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 744 1 744 1 744
221 221 221 221 221 221 221 209 209 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.130 0.394 0.113 0.141 0.132 0.093 0.112 0.134 0.094
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household household household household household
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Econometric model: Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-4, 6-10), Logit (Column 5). Details of the various specifications at the bottom of the table are valid for both panels. Marginal effects in 
Column 5 have been computed following Cornelissen and Sonderhof (2009). Definitions of "Migration household", "Program", "Timing", "Eligible," and household in 
the text. See Table 4 for the list of household controls.
Table 5
Migrant household
PANEL A: HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION, RESTRICTED SAMPLE
BASELINE ESTIMATES
PANEL B: HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION, PANEL ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable:
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
OLS OLS LPM LPM OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*Eligible 0.003 -0.009 0.003 -0.000 -0.001
(0.063) (0.058) 0.068 (0.128) (0.017)
0.019 0.012 0.018 0.024
(0.088) (0.086) (0.145) (0.024)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ejido-controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 926 872 872 872 872 866 813 813 813
Number of ejidos 221 210 210 210 210 208 196 196 196
Adjusted R-squared 0.000 0.077 0.142 0.087 0.039 -0.002 0.083 0.084 0.051
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Migrant 
household
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
LPM LPM LPM Logit, marg LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*Eligible*1997 0.097 0.113* 0.111* 0.119 0.308 0.073***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) 0.060 (0.188) (0.024)
Timing*Eligible*1997 0.084** 0.228** 0.048***
(0.043) (0.112) (0.015)
In-Process*Eligible*1997 -0.045 -0.036 -0.033 -0.024 -0.125 0.005 -0.021 -0.083 0.006
(0.094) (0.090) (0.089) 0.072 (0.234) (0.034) (0.088) (0.228) (0.033)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects household household household household household household
Observations 1 852 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 744 1 744 1 744
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 221 209 209 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.130 0.113 0.143 0.133 0.093 0.112 0.134 0.094
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Marginal effect associated 
to Logit in Panel A computed following Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004); while in Panel B we followed Cornelissen and Sonderhof (2009). The definitions of 
"Migrant household," "Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household are in the text. All estimates in Panel A include: Program (or Timing, in Columns 7-9), 
Soon-to-be-certified, Eligible. All estimates in Panel B include: Program*1997 (or Timing*1997, in Columns 7-9), In-process*1997, Eligible*1997, 1997. See 
Table 4 for the list of household and ejido controls.
Table 6
ROBUSTNESS TEST: ANTICIPATORY RESPONSE TO THE PROGRAM
PANEL A: CROSS-SECTION 1994
Soon-To-Be-Certified 
*Eligible
Migrant household
Migrant household Migrant household
PANEL B: PANEL SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Model:
Sample: All Will No Will
coef/t coef/t coef/t
Program*Eligible*1997 0.121** 0.039 0.147**
(0.062) (0.103) (0.070)
Program*1997 -0.054 -0.034 -0.041
(0.053) (0.077) (0.060)
Eligible*1997 -0.042 0.022 -0.051
(0.041) (0.066) (0.049)
1997 0.135*** 0.120** 0.122***
(0.038) (0.052) (0.045)
Constant yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes
Fixed effects household household household
Observations 1 849 661 1 178
Number of ejidos 221 149 195
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.087 0.132
HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION, IMPACT BY INHERITANCE STATUS
Table 7
Migrant household
LPM
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. 
Sample: all households (Column 1); households with a will (Column 
2); households without a will (Column 3). Econometric 
methodology: Linear Probability Model (LPM). Definitions of 
"Migrant household," "Program," "Eligible," and household in the 
text. See Table 4 for the list of household controls.
All
Program No Program Diff Program No Program Diff Diff-diff
mean mean mean t-stat mean mean t-stat t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Migration variables
At least one household member currently living at home has 
been abroad (last 3 years)
0.08 0.11 0.07 (1.513) 0.07 0.07 (0.031) (1.044)
At least one household head's child is currently abroad 0.23 0.23 0.25 (-0.212) 0.18 0.27 (-1.479) (1.178)
Migrant household (last 3 years) 0.29 0.32 0.28 (0.610) 0.23 0.31 (-1.224) (1.498)
Number of migrants abroad (last 3 years) 0.72 0.77 0.72 (0.272) 0.52 0.83 (-1.511) (1.538)
B: Household composition
Household head's age 52.88 53.71 53.89 (-0.136) 51.23 51.15 (0.048) (-0.128)
Household head's sex 0.97 0.96 0.97 (-0.740) 0.96 0.99 (-1.484) (0.754)
Household head's schooling 3.20 3.33 3.06 (0.935) 3.47 2.92 (1.507) (-0.675)
Average schooling of adult members 4.66 4.67 4.68 (-0.067) 4.78 4.48 (0.910) (-0.881)
Number of adult members 6.71 6.65 6.99 (-1.010) 6.40 6.62 (-0.509) (-0.221)
Share females among adult members 0.37 0.38 0.38 (0.099) 0.38 0.37 (0.431) (-0.300)
Number of household head's siblings abroad 0.38 0.38 0.38 (-0.016) 0.28 0.47 (-1.225) (1.121)
C: Household assets
1992 land assets (owned) 11.76 12.09 12.31 (-0.139) 10.61 11.29 (-0.325) (0.205)
Hired labor 0.45 0.44 0.49 (-0.984) 0.43 0.41 (0.270) (-0.843)
Tractor 0.46 0.56 0.41 (2.511) ** 0.47 0.37 (1.141) (0.621)
Pickup 0.21 0.24 0.17 (1.767) * 0.19 0.25 (-0.878) (1.724) *
Machinery 0.59 0.69 0.53 (2.647) *** 0.60 0.50 (1.199) (0.642)
Cattle 0.45 0.40 0.53 (-2.430) ** 0.36 0.52 (-2.212) ** (0.417)
Horses 0.30 0.28 0.34 (-1.364) 0.21 0.34 (-2.121) ** (0.921)
D: Land transactions
At least one land rental transaction (1994-1997) 0.21 0.28 0.19 (2.081) ** 0.17 0.17 (-0.008) (1.407)
At least one plot rented in (1994-1997) 0.09 0.11 0.08 (1.227) 0.07 0.10 (-1.044) (1.559)
At least one plot rented out (1994-1997) 0.09 0.14 0.08 (1.813) * 0.08 0.03 (1.610) (0.396)
Observations 926 298 302 169 157
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (1) reports sample means from the 1997 household survey. Columns (4) reports the t-
statistics of the difference (2)-(3). Column (7) reports the t-statistic of the difference (5)-(6). Column (8) reports the t-statistic of the difference [(2)-(3)]-[(5)-(6)]. 
Standard error associated with the diff-in-mean tests have been clustered at the ejido-level. Definitions of "Migrant household," "Program," "Eligible," and 
household in the text. All migration indicators (but the number of migrants) are binary variables. Land assets measured in National Rainfed Equivalent (NRE) 
hectares. For a description of the procedure, see de Janvry et al. (1997). The number of adult members is computed relative to the biological household, i.e., 
household members currently living at home and children of the household head living outside home.
Table A1
AFTER-PROGRAM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL
Eligible Non-Eligible
All
Early Late Diff Early Late Diff Diff-diff
mean mean mean t-stat mean mean t-stat t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Migration variables
At least one household member currently living at home has 
been abroad (last 3 years)
0.04 0.07 0.02 (2.250) ** 0.03 0.01 (0.707) (1.193)
At least one household head's child is currently abroad 0.09 0.07 0.09 (-0.534) 0.11 0.08 (0.393) (-0.648)
Migrant household (last 3 years) 0.12 0.14 0.11 (0.542) 0.14 0.10 (0.591) (-0.169)
Number of migrants abroad (last 3 years) 0.23 0.28 0.21 (0.637) 0.19 0.21 (-0.131) (0.508)
B: Household composition
Household head's age 49.36 49.85 51.13 (-0.520) 47.69 47.49 (0.075) (-0.415)
Household head's sex 0.96 0.97 0.96 (0.606) 0.9 0.99 (-2.097) ** (2.195) **
Household head's schooling 3.49 3.11 3.91 (-1.868) * 3.45 3.59 (-0.255) (-1.049)
Average schooling of adult members 4.71 4.72 4.91 (-0.447) 4.26 4.80 (-1.159) (0.611)
Number of adult members 3.30 3.27 3.26 (0.040) 2.90 3.74 (-2.256) ** (1.948) *
Share females among adult members 0.45 0.44 0.47 (-0.949) 0.47 0.43 (1.118) (-1.568)
Number of household head's siblings abroad 0.10 0.15 0.04 (1.845) * 0.14 0.07 (0.963) (0.561)
C: Household assets
1992 land assets (owned) 11.86 11.32 13.66 (-0.973) 8.56 13.18 (-1.848) * (0.877)
Access to electricity 0.69 0.64 0.75 (-0.991) 0.66 0.71 (-0.451) (-0.386)
Tractor 0.53 0.59 0.47 (1.191) 0.56 0.46 (0.721) (0.182)
Pickup 0.34 0.36 0.40 (-0.426) 0.31 0.26 (0.481) (-0.723)
Machinery 0.64 0.68 0.62 (0.667) 0.67 0.60 (0.642) (-0.069)
Cattle 0.43 0.40 0.50 (-1.118) 0.38 0.42 (-0.439) (-0.540)
Horses 0.25 0.25 0.28 (-0.549) 0.32 0.14 (2.558) ** (-2.477) **
Observations 414 142 116 72 84
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (1) reports sample means from the 1994 household survey. Columns (4) reports the t-statistics 
of the difference (2)-(3). Column (7) reports the t-statistic of the difference (5)-(6). Column (8) reports the t-statistic of the difference [(2)-(3)]-[(5)-(6)]. Standard errors 
associated with the diff-in-mean tests have been clustered at the ejido level. Definitions of "Migrant household," "Early," "Late," "Eligible,"and household in the text. 
Land assets measured in National Rainfed Equivalent (NRE) hectares. For a description of the procedure, see de Janvry et al. (1997).
Table A2
PRE-PROGRAM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, EARLY VS LATE PROGRAM AREAS
Eligible Non-Eligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Number migrants
Share 
migrants
Migrant 
household
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects 
OLS OLS LPM OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*1997*Eligible 0.112* 0.116* 0.118* 0.117* 0.126 0.352** 0.069***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) 0.054 (0.164) (0.021)
Program*1997 -0.047 -0.040 -0.043 -0.044 0.034 -0.159 -0.033*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.054) 0.036 (0.140) (0.018)
Timing*1997*Eligible 0.085** 0.249** 0.046***
(0.041) (0.104) (0.014)
Timing*1997 -0.036 -0.124 -0.023**
(0.035) (0.086) (0.011)
Eligible*1997 -0.056 -0.060 -0.061 -0.053 0.074 -0.239** -0.046*** -0.052 -0.252** -0.046***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) 0.072 (0.113) (0.017) (0.038) (0.107) (0.016)
1997 0.166*** 0.137*** 0.144*** 0.140*** 0.120 0.490*** 0.071*** 0.141*** 0.506*** 0.071***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) 0.018 (0.112) (0.017) (0.037) (0.105) (0.016)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household assets yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household household household household household
Observations 1 852 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 744 1 744 1 744
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 209 209 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.161 0.399 0.131 0.179 0.162 0.111 0.134 0.166 0.114
Table A3
PANEL ESTIMATES, ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
Migrant household
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors  (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Econometric model: Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-4, 6-10), Logit (column 5). Marginal effects in Column 6 have been computed following Cornelissen and Sonderhof 
(2009). Definitions of "Migrant household," "Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household in the text. See Table 4 for the list of household controls. Household 
assets are the  binary indicators for: use tractor; use machinery; ownership cattle; ownership work animal. All additional controls are included in levels (using 
their pre-program value) and interacted with the 1997 time indicator.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Number migrants
Share 
migrants
Migrant 
household
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
OLS OLS LPM OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*1997 0.065 0.077* 0.074* 0.074* 0.079 0.200* 0.037**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) 0.042 (0.118) (0.015)
Timing*1997 0.050** 0.128* 0.023**
(0.024) (0.069) (0.009)
1997 0.109*** 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.085 0.246*** 0.025*** 0.088*** 0.251*** 0.026***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) 0.026 (0.064) (0.008) (0.023) (0.061) (0.008)
Observations 1 200 1 198 1 198 1 198 1 198 1 198 1 198 1 118 1 118 1 118
Number of ejidos 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 176 176 176
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.163 0.389 0.121 0.177 0.149 0.102 0.117 0.145 0.096
Program*1997 -0.047 -0.050 -0.050 -0.049 -0.044 -0.180 -0.035*
(0.053) (0.056) (0.064) (0.057) 0.061 (0.151) (0.018)
Timing*1997 -0.038 -0.135 -0.023**
(0.036) (0.092) (0.012)
1997 0.166*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.123 0.509*** 0.071*** 0.146*** 0.528*** 0.072***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.047) (0.042) 0.038 (0.123) (0.017) (0.039) (0.114) (0.016)
Observations 652 651 651 651 651 651 651 626 626 626
Number of ejidos 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 135 135 135
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.160 0.441 0.189 0.197 0.223 0.197 0.195 0.232 0.207
Program*1997 0.026 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.042 0.064 0.011
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) 0.036 (0.098) (0.012)
Timing*1997 0.022 0.039 0.007
(0.021) (0.057) (0.008)
1997 0.129*** 0.096*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.098 0.336*** 0.041*** 0.107*** 0.342*** 0.041***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 0.024 (0.064) (0.009) (0.023) (0.062) (0.008)
Observations 1 852 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 744 1 744 1 744
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 209 209 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.160 0.396 0.128 0.171 0.158 0.103 0.127 0.159 0.103
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household household household household household
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Details of the various 
specifications at the bottom of the table are valid for both panels. Definitions of "Migrant household," "Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household in 
the text. See Table 4 for the list of household controls. 
PANEL C: ALL HOUSEHOLDS
Table A4
HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION, PANEL ESTIMATES
PANEL A: ELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLDS
Migrant household
PANEL B: NON-ELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLDS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Number migrants
Share 
migrants
Migrant 
household
Number 
migrants
Share 
migrants
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
OLS OLS LPM OLS OLS
coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t coef/t
Program*1997*Eligible 0.134* 0.155* 0.151* 0.141* 0.153 0.489** 0.092***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.085) (0.080) 0.073 (0.209) (0.027)
Program*1997 -0.052 -0.062 -0.060 -0.054 0.035 -0.219 -0.044**
(0.068) (0.066) (0.070) (0.068) 0.046 (0.168) (0.022)
Timing*1997*Eligible 0.096* 0.293** 0.059***
(0.052) (0.131) (0.018)
Timing*1997 -0.036 -0.134 -0.028**
(0.043) (0.105) (0.014)
Eligible*1997 -0.043 -0.040 -0.034 -0.015 0.096 -0.224 -0.049** -0.018 -0.223 -0.050**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) 0.086 (0.144) (0.023) (0.050) (0.141) (0.022)
1997 0.172*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.133 0.516*** 0.078*** 0.132*** 0.520*** 0.080***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) 0.023 (0.139) (0.022) (0.044) (0.133) (0.021)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household household household household household
Observations 1 328 1 326 1 326 1 326 1 326 1 326 1 326 1 245 1 245 1 245
Number of ejidos 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 150 150 150
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.146 0.402 0.134 0.158 0.151 0.112 0.133 0.152 0.114
Table A5
EXCLUDE EJIDOS WHICH IMPLEMENTED OR FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM BECAUSE OF BORDER ISSUES
Migrant household
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Econometric model: Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-4, 6-10), Logit (column 5). Sample: exclude ejidos which report having implemented the program because of border issues (46 ejidos) or 
having failed to implement the program because of border issues and/or disputes between eligible and non-eligible households (16 ejidos). Definitions of "Migrant 
household," "Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household in the text. See Table 4 for the list of household controls. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Number laborers
Share 
laborers
Non-agricultural 
status
Number 
laborers
Share 
laborers
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
OLS OLS LPM OLS OLS
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program*1997*Eligible -0.073 -0.035 -0.035 -0.018 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010
(0.069) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066) 0.064 (0.141) (0.026)
Program*1997 0.090* 0.063 0.064 0.042 0.039 0.063 0.017
(0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) 0.032 (0.120) (0.021)
Timing*1997*Eligible -0.006 -0.025 -0.006
(0.037) (0.078) (0.016)
Timing*1997 0.006 0.032 0.005
(0.029) (0.067) (0.013)
Eligible*1997 0.075 0.065 0.059 0.078* 0.063 0.105 0.024 0.079* 0.143* 0.027
(0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) 0.034 (0.085) (0.018) (0.045) (0.087) (0.017)
1997 -0.019 -0.026 -0.020 -0.031 0.038 -0.078 -0.008 -0.031 -0.103 -0.010
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) 0.016 (0.066) (0.014) (0.033) (0.066) (0.013)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household household household household household
Observations 1 852 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 849 1 744 1 744 1 744
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 209 209 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.114 0.187 0.080 0.135 0.070 0.065 0.090 0.075 0.070
Table A6
PANEL ESTIMATES, NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOR (MEMBERS CURRENTLY AT HOME)
Non-agricultural status
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the ejido level. Econometric model: Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-4, 6-10), Logit (column 5). Definition non-agricultural status: binary indicator taking value 1 if at least one member 
reports working outside agriculture as primary occupation. Definitions of "Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household in the text. See Table 4 for the list of 
household controls. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model: LPM LPM LPM LPM
Logit, marg 
effects
LPM
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Program *Eligible*1997 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.077
(0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) 0.086
Program*1997 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.031 -0.004
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) 0.020
Timing *Eligible*1997 0.019
(0.028)
Timing*1997 -0.005
(0.024)
Eligible*1997 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.036 -0.073 -0.027
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.032) 0.056 (0.031)
1997 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.053* 0.030 0.042
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) 0.011 (0.028)
Observations 1 848 1 845 1 845 1 845 1 845 1 740
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.154 0.008 0.022 0.009
Program *Eligible*1997 -0.042 -0.018 -0.034 -0.055 -0.014
(0.097) (0.098) (0.105) (0.100) 0.102
Program*1997 -0.063 -0.083 -0.070 -0.054 -0.098
(0.085) (0.085) (0.092) (0.088) 0.048
Timing *Eligible*1997 -0.003
(0.060)
Timing*1997 -0.074
(0.049)
Eligible*1997 -0.011 -0.018 -0.014 -0.009 -0.033 -0.029
(0.078) (0.078) (0.084) (0.081) 0.053 (0.077)
1997 0.134* 0.144** 0.140* 0.129* 0.088 0.155**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.074) 0.025 (0.070)
Observations 1 851 1 848 1 848 1 848 1 848 1 743
Number of ejidos 221 221 221 221 221 209
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.033 0.221 0.024 0.033 0.030
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects ejido household household
Table A7
PANEL ESTIMATES, OTHER OUTCOMES
PANEL B: WAGE (NON-FAMILY) LABOR
PANEL A: LAND TRANSACTIONS (RENTALS)
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) 
clustered at the ejido level. Econometric model: Linear Probability Model (LPM) or OLS (Column 1-4, 6), 
Logit (Column 5). Dependent variable: land transactions status (Panel A), wage (non-family) labor status 
(Panel B). Definition land transactions status: binary indicator taking value 1 if the household rented 
out or rented in land within the previous 3 years. Definition wage (non-family) labor status: binary 
indicator taking value 1 if the household hired any non-family member within the previous 24 months. 
Details of the various specifications at the bottom of the table are valid for both panels. Definitions of 
"Program," "Timing," "Eligible," and household in the text. See Table 4 for the list of household 
controls. 
